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Abstract
This paper formulates a duopoly model in which ¯rms care about relative pro¯ts as well
as their own pro¯ts. Our purpose is to investigate the relationship between the weight of
relative performance and R&D expenditure. We ¯nd a non-monotone relationship between
the weight of relative performance in their objectives and their R&D levels. Both highly
reciprocal (altruism) and negative reciprocal attitudes yield high levels of R&D, while the
intermediate situations yield low levels of R&D.
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1 Introduction
One tends to care about the performance of other people as well as one's own performance.
This concern may either stem from the available incentive schemes or from just one's intrinsic
interest. For instance, evaluations of managers' performances are often based on their relative
performance as well as their absolute performance (Murphy (1998)). Outperforming managers
often obtain good positions in management job markets. In this case, these managers act in a
way that allows them to meet the relevant incentive schemes. Moreover, a considerable amount
of laboratory (experimental) research has pointed out spiteful behavior as well as reciprocal
or altruistic behavior, which is closely related to the objective functions of agents based on
relative performance (Brandts et al. (2004), Cason et al. (2002), and Coats and Neilson (2005)).
These reciprocal and spiteful preferences often stem from genuine emotions or incentive schemes.
Therefore, incorporating these preferences into a model is an important research topic.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the payo® functions of
¯rms incorporating both positive and negative reciprocal preferences and the R&D expenditures
of the ¯rms. The outline of the model treated here is as follows. Firm i's payo® is its relative
pro¯t ¼i¡®¼j , where ¼i is its own pro¯t, ¼j is the rival's pro¯t, and ® 2 (¡1; 1): The parameter
® represents the degree of reciprocal preference. If ® is positive, the ¯rms envy the rivals'
success. If ® is negative, the ¯rms have reciprocal (altruism) payo® functions.1
We ¯nd a non-monotone (U-shaped) relationship between the degree of reciprocal preference
® and the innovation activities. Given a nonpositive ®, an increase in ® reduces R&D. When ®
reaches a critical value (which is strictly larger than 0), the relationship is inverted. From the
critical value of ®, an increase in ® increases the levels of R&D. This result indicates that R&D
activities are quite active in both highly cooperative (® is close to ¡1) and highly noncooperative
1 The parameter ® is closely related to the \coe±cient of e®ective sympathy" used by Edgeworth (1881)
and \coe±cient of cooperation" used by Cyert and DeGroot (1973). For discussions on non-pro¯t maximizing
preferences in this context, see Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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(® is close to 1) societies, while they are less active in the intermediate cases.2
Through the direct interpretation of ®, our result sheds some light on how reciprocal and
negative reciprocal attitudes a®ect R&D. Given the pure sel¯sh preferences of ¯rms, an intro-
duction of minor spiteful preferences reduces their innovative activities, but an introduction of
signi¯cant spiteful preferences stimulates their innovation.3
We extend our basic analysis in two directions. First, we consider a joint R&D implemen-
tation where ¯rms cooperatively choose their R&D levels and then compete in the product
markets. In general, collusion in the product market is per se illegal, while it is possible for
R&D cooperation to be allowed. Thus, this situation is worth discussing. It is shown that in
this situation, an increase in ® reduces R&D. Second, an oligopoly model is considered. It is
shown that an increase in ® is less likely to stimulate R&D when the number of ¯rms is larger.
We add some comments on rationales for discussing objective functions on the basis of rela-
tive performance. First, relative performance, especially in a positive ® case, is quite important
from the viewpoint of evolutionary stability.4 Second, owners of ¯rms often have incentives for
adopting a positive ® in the context of strategic commitment games (Kockesen et al., 2000).
2 Although the literature on strategic R&D competition is fairly abundant, most papers assume Cournot
competition, where ¯rms maximize their own pro¯ts. See, among others, Brander and Spencer (1983), Spence
(1984), d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Suzumura (1992), Kamien et al. (1992), Matsumura (1995), and
Lahiri and Ono (1999).
3 The payo® functions that are based on relative wage or relative wealth status have also been intensively
discussed in the macroeconomics context. Keynes (1936) discussed the rigidity of nominal wage based on relative
wage. See also Akerlof and Yellen (1988), Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 1999), and Futagami and Shibata (1998).
The relative performance approach is important in political science. Obviously, a party cares about the number
of votes obtained not in absolute terms but in relative terms. In addition, in the context of international policies,
the possibility that governments care about their relative performance as well as absolute performance is pointed
out. See, among others, Grieco et al. (1993) and Mastanduno (1991).
4 See Alchian (1950) and Vega-Redondo (1997). Vega-Redondo (1997) also shows that Cournot competition
with relative performance objectives yields the Bertrand outcome even in duopoly, and this outcome is evolutionary
stable.
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Third, as mentioned in Symeonidis (2008), we can interpret ® as a parameter indicating severity
of competition.5 ® = 0 indicates the standard Cournot case; ® = 1, the perfectly competitive
case (related to the Bertrand case); and ® = ¡1, the monopoly case. Thus, a larger ® indicates
a more competitive market.6 The relative performance approach enables us to treat compet-
itiveness as a continuous variable, and this model contains three standard models|Cournot,
Bertrand, and monopoly|as special cases. We believe that our formulation has su±cient im-
portance for an investigation into innovations and that our relative pro¯t approach is applicable
to many other problems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates our basic model. In
Section 3, we demonstrate the U-shaped relationship between ® and R&D expenditures. Section
4 provides the analysis of joint R&D implementation. In Section 5, the basic model is extended
to the case of oligopoly. We discuss welfare implications in Section 6. Section 7 concludes this
paper. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Basic Model
We formulate a two-stage symmetric duopoly model. In the ¯rst stage, ¯rm i (i = 1; 2) chooses
its R&D level Ii. At the beginning of the second stage, each ¯rm observes the rival's R&D.
In the second stage, ¯rms produce perfectly substitutable commodities for which the market
demand function is given by p = a ¡ Y (price as a function of quantity), where Y is the total
output of the ¯rms. Let yi denote the output of ¯rm i. Firm i's marginal production cost ci
depends on Ii: Each ¯rm i chooses yi independently.
The payo® of ¯rm i (i = 1; 2) is given by Ui = ¼i¡®¼j (i 6= j); where ¼i is the pro¯t of ¯rm
5 See also Shubik (1980), Brod and Shivakumar (1999), and Symeonidis (2000).
6 Under the standard conditions in Cournot, the ratio of the pro¯t margin (the price minus the marginal cost)
and the price, called the Lerner index, is decreasing in ®. This index is intensively used in the empirical literature
as a measure of competitiveness in product markets.
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i and ® 2 (¡1; 1). The parameter ® indicates the importance of relative performance for ¯rm
i's management. The ¯rm i's pro¯t ¼i is given by ¼i = (a ¡ Y )yi ¡ ci(Ii)yi ¡ Ii: It is assumed
that c0i · 0 and c00i is positive and su±ciently large so as to satisfy the second-order condition at
the ¯rst stage. We also assume that limI!0 c0(I) = ¡1 and limI!1 c0(I) = 0 so as to ensure
the interior solution at the ¯rst stage.
3 Equilibrium Analysis and the U-shaped Relationship
In this section, we study a situation where two ¯rms maximizing relative pro¯ts compete in the
market. The game is solved by backward induction. In the second stage competition, given the
investments Ii of two ¯rms, each ¯rm independently chooses its output to maximize the relative
pro¯t Ui. The ¯rst-order condition is as follows:
a¡ 2yi ¡ (1¡ ®)yj = ci (i = 1; 2; i 6= j): (1)
Obviously, the second-order condition is satis¯ed. Arranging this equation, we obtain the fol-
lowing reaction function:
yi = Ri(yj : ®) =
a¡ ci ¡ (1¡ ®)yj
2
: (2)
By solving the ¯rst-order condition, the second stage equilibrium outputs are obtained:
yE1 =
(1 + ®)a¡ 2c1 + (1¡ ®)c2
(1 + ®)(3¡ ®) ; y
E
2 =
(1 + ®)a¡ 2c2 + (1¡ ®)c1
(1 + ®)(3¡ ®) : (3)
The resulting pro¯t of ¯rm i is given by
¼Ei (ci; cj) =
[(1¡ ®)a¡ (2¡ ®)ci + cj ][(1 + ®)a¡ 2ci + (1¡ ®)cj ]
(3¡ ®)2(1 + ®) ¡ Ii: (4)
Next, we consider the ¯rst stage R&D competition. In this stage, each ¯rm i independently
chooses Ii so as to maximize Ui = ¼Ei ¡ ®¼Ej . We restrict our attention to the symmetric
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equilibrium because the su±ciently large c00i guarantees that the unique equilibrium is symmetric.
The ¯rst-order condition is
¡ [(1 + ®)a¡ 2ci + (1¡ ®)cj ][4¡ 3®+ ®
2]
(3¡ ®)2(1 + ®) c
0
i = 1: (5)
The second-order condition is satis¯ed. On substituting c1 = c2 = c into (5), we have that
¡G(®)c0 = 1 must be satis¯ed, where
G(®) :=
(a¡ c)(4¡ 3®+ ®2)
(3¡ ®)2 :
Let IE denote the equilibrium R&D investment level. A larger G and a larger jc0j imply a higher
marginal bene¯t of R&D. Since the payo® function is assumed to be concave with respect to Ii
(c00 is large enough), a larger G (as well as larger jc0j) yields a higher level of the equilibrium
R&D investment.
We discuss how ® a®ects the equilibrium R&D level. We ¯nd a non-monotone relationship
between the equilibrium level of R&D (IE) and the weight of relative performance (®).
Proposition 1 Suppose that two ¯rms compete in a product market, and they make their R&D
investments independently. Then, the equilibrium R&D investment level IE is decreasing in ®
for ® < 1=3 and is increasing in ® for ® > 1=3.
We explain the intuition behind Proposition 1. Since yEi is increasing in ®, the cost-
minimizing level of R&D, which is derived by minimizing ciyEi + Ii, is increasing in ®. Thus,
for the purpose of cost minimization (minimization of production cost plus R&D cost), ¯rm i
has a stronger incentive for R&D when ® is larger. On the other hand, ¯rm i has a weaker
incentive for innovation for strategic purposes.7 From (2), we have that jR0ij is decreasing in ®:
This implies that the strategic value of R&D is decreasing in ®. The former dominates when
7 From (3) we see that an increase in Ii (a decrease in ci) decreases y
E
j , and it results in an increase in ¼i
(i; j 2 f1; 2g; i 6= j). This is the strategic value of R&D. For this strategic e®ect of R&D, see Brander and Spencer
(1983).
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® is large, while the latter dominates when ® is small. This yields the U-shaped relationship
between ® and the equilibrium R&D level.
The implications of Proposition 1 are as follows. Both aggressive competition (the case where
® is close to 1) and a collusive situation (the case where ® is close to ¡1) yield high levels of
R&D.8 Our result is related to two in°uential views on the relationship between competitiveness
and R&D.9 One view is the monopoly view. The monopoly yields intensive R&D investments.
The other is the competition view. Severe competition accelerates innovation. Researchers have
presented many theoretical foundations and empirical (or anecdotal) evidences supporting both
views. Using a single model, we explain that both views can be accurate.
In our setting, R&D is minimized when ® = 1=3: Starting Cournot competition (® = 0),
a slight increase in ® decreases R&D investments, while a large increase in ® increases them.
Thus, an envy society (positive ®) in which people care about their relative performances as
well as their absolute performances can yield either more or less aggressive R&D activities.
4 Joint R&D Implementation
The question is whether or not our result depends on the assumption about the formation of
R&D activities. Then, we consider the case in which two ¯rms10 cooperatively determine their
investment level I to maximize their joint pro¯ts, while they noncooperatively compete in the
8 For the relationship between ® and market competition, see the rationale in the second last paragraph of the
introduction.
9 Economists have long been interested in the relationship between product market competition and innovation.
See Aghion et al. (2005). They show an inverse U-shaped relationship between toughness of competition and the
equilibrium level of R&D. Traditionally, many researchers believe that monopoly yields intensive R&D (monopoly
view), while many others believe that competition yields intensive R&D (competition view). Both have presented
many theoretical foundations and empirical (or anecdotal) evidences supporting their views. See, for example,
Schumpeter (1950) and Arrow (1962). See also Mateus and Moreira (2007), Cabral (2000), and the works cited
in these books.
10 We can show that Proposition 2 holds true in n-¯rm oligopoly too.
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product market.11 Some points of the basic model are modi¯ed. Each ¯rm has a common
marginal cost d(I) that depends on the joint R&D investment I. We assume that each ¯rm pays
half of the joint R&D cost I. Thus, ¯rm i's pro¯t is given by
¦i = (a¡ Y )yi ¡ d(I)yi ¡ I2 :
It is assumed that d0(I) < 0 and d00(I) is positive and su±ciently large. We also assume that
limI!0 d0(I) = ¡1 and limI!1 d0(I) = 0 so as to ensure the interior solution at the ¯rst stage.
We consider a two-stage game. In the ¯rst stage, the ¯rms choose their R&D level coopera-
tively. In the second stage, they noncooperatively produce perfectly substitutable commodities.
We now solve the game. The second stage competition has already been discussed in the
previous section: all that needs to be done now is replace c(I) with d(I). In the ¯rst stage, the
¯rms choose the investment level I. The ¯rst-order condition is as follows:
¡2(a¡ d)(1¡ ®)
(3¡ ®)2 d
0(I) = 1: (6)
The left-hand side in (6) is the marginal bene¯t of their joint R&D investment and the right-
hand side in (6) is the marginal cost of the investment. Let IC denote the equilibrium R&D
investment level. De¯ne H(®) := 2(a¡d)(1¡®)=(3¡®)2: Because of the concavity of the payo®
function, which is guaranteed by the assumption of su±ciently large d00, a larger H implies a
higher level of investment. We investigate how ® a®ects the equilibrium R&D level. In contrast
to the case of noncooperative investment, we ¯nd a monotone relationship between the R&D
level and the weight of relative performance ®.
Proposition 2 Suppose that two ¯rms compete in a product market, and they make their R&D
investments cooperatively. Then, the equilibrium R&D investment level IC is decreasing in ®
for ¡1 < ® < 1.
11 Explicit collusion in product markets is usually illegal, while cooperation at the R&D stage is often permitted
by anti-monopoly legislations.
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We explain the intuition behind Proposition 2. A decrease in d (the common cost of two
¯rms) lowers the price. Since dp=dd = 2=(3¡®), dp=dd is increasing in ®. In other words, when
® is large, a cost reduction by R&D reduces the equilibrium price substantially; thus, ¯rms lose
incentives for R&D. This yields a smaller R&D level as ® is larger.
Proposition 2 suggests that under joint implementation of R&D, spiteful preference can be
obstacles to innovations.
5 Oligopoly
In this section, we move back to the model with noncooperative investment and discuss an
oligopoly version. Regarding the payo® function based on relative performance, there are several
di®erent formulations: (a) each ¯rm cares about the average pro¯ts of the rivals (the other ¯rms);
(b) each ¯rm cares about the highest pro¯t ¯rms among the rivals; and (c) each ¯rm has one
speci¯c rival as a benchmark ¯rm and cares about its pro¯t only. Since all formulations yield
exactly the same results in our model, we adopt the ¯rst formulation.
There are n(¸ 3) symmetric ¯rms and they engage in the two-stage game formulated in
Section 2. According to formulation (a), the payo® of ¯rm i (i = 1; 2; :::n) is given by:
Ui = ¼1 ¡ ®
n¡ 1
X
i6=i
¼j :
Let ¯ := ®=(n ¡ 1): If we interpret ¯ as an indicator of the degree of envy or altruism, it is
natural to assume that ¯ 2 (¡1; 1): On the other hand, if we interpret ¯ as an indicator of the
degree of competition, it is natural to assume that ¯ 2 (¡1; 1=(n¡ 1)), because the case where
¯ = 1=(n¡ 1) corresponds to the perfect competition.
Consider the second stage competition (quantity competition). The ¯rst-order condition of
each ¯rm is as follows:
a¡ 2yi ¡ (1¡ ¯)
X
j 6=i
yj = ci: (7)
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The reaction function of ¯rm i is as follows:
yi = Ri(Y¡i : ¯) =
a¡ ci ¡ (1¡ ¯)Y¡i
2
; (8)
where Y¡i =
P
j 6=i yj . Summing each side in (7) for all ¯rms, we have
na¡ 2Y ¡ (1¡ ¯)(n¡ 1)Y =
X
i
ci: (9)
Rearranging (9), the second stage total output is obtained:
Y =
na¡Pi ci
2 +B
; (10)
where
B := (1¡ ¯)(n¡ 1):
Note that Y is increasing in ¯. From (7) and (10), we have the second stage output of each ¯rm:
yEi =
(1 + ¯)a¡ (1 + ¯ +B)ci + (1¡ ¯)
P
j 6=i cj
(1 + ¯)(2 +B)
:
The equilibrium pro¯t of ¯rm i given the ¯rst stage actions of ¯rms is denoted by
¼Ei =
©
a[1¡ (n¡ 1)¯]¡ (1 +B)ci +
P
j 6=i cj
ª£
(1 + ¯)a¡ (1 + ¯ +B)ci + (1¡ ¯)
P
j 6=i cj
¤
(1 + ¯)(2 +B)2
¡Ii:
Consider the ¯rst stage competition. Each ¯rm i maximizes Ui = ¼Ei ¡ ¯
P
j 6=i ¼
E
j with
respect to Ii: We again restrict our attention to the symmetric equilibrium. Di®erentiating Ui
with Ii, and then substituting cj = c for all ¯rms we obtain
¡J(¯; n)c0 = 1;
where
J(¯; n) :=
(a¡ c)(¯ + ¯2 + 2n¡ 2¯2n¡ ¯n2 + ¯2n2)
(2 +B)2
:
Then, we have the following result.
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Proposition 3 Suppose that n(¸ 3) ¯rms compete in a market, and they make their R&D
investments independently. Then, the equilibrium R&D investment level IE is decreasing in ¯
for ¯ < ¹¯ and is increasing in ¯ for ¯ > ¹¯, where ¹¯ := (n¡ 1)=(n+ 1):
The threshold value of ¯ in Proposition 3 is increasing in n. This indicates that an increase
in ¯ (and so ®) is more likely to decrease R&D investments when n is large. As we discussed
in Section 3, an increase in ® has two countervailing e®ects. On the one hand, an increase in
® increases the equilibrium output of each ¯rm and stimulates R&D. On the other hand, an
increase in ® reduces jR0ij and so reduces the strategic value of R&D. The former e®ect becomes
weaker when n is large, and thus, the latter e®ect more likely dominates the former when n is
large.
6 Welfare Analysis
In this section, we examine welfare implications in duopoly with non-cooperative investment.
The equilibrium investment level is compared to the second-best investment level. Social welfare
W is the consumer surplus plus pro¯t of ¯rms:
W :=
Z Y
0
p(y)dy ¡ p(Y )Y + ¼1 + ¼2:
Suppose that the social planner cannot control the competition in the second stage and can
control only I, the R&D investment level of each ¯rm (the second-best problem). This problem
is intensively discussed in the literature of R&D competition. Let I¤ denote the second-best
R&D level.12 We compare I¤ with IE ; the equilibrium R&D investment level.
The ¯rst-order condition for the social planner is given by
dWE
dI1
= ¡
h4a+ 2a®¡ 2a®2 ¡ 11c1 + 5®c1 + 7c2 ¡ 7®c2 + 2®2c2
(3¡ ®)2(1 + ®)
i
c01 ¡ 1 = 0: (11)
12 We implicitly assume that the second-best outcome is symmetric. This holds true for su±ciently large c00i :
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Since c00i is positive and su±ciently large, the second-order condition is satis¯ed. Substituting
c1 = c2 = c into (11), we have that ¡K(®)c0 = 1 must be satis¯ed, where
K(®) :=
2(a¡ c)(2¡ ®)
(3¡ ®)2 :
A larger K implies a higher level of I¤, and I¤ > (<)IE if and only if K(®) > (<)G(®) (the
de¯nition of G(®) is given in Section 3).
We now state welfare implications.
Proposition 4 Suppose that two ¯rms compete in a market, and they make their R&D invest-
ments independently. Then,
(i) I¤ is increasing in ® for ¡1 < ® < 1.
(ii) I¤ < IE for ¡1 < ® < 0, and I¤ > IE for 0 < ® < 1.
Proposition 4(i) states that the second-best R&D level is increasing in the reciprocal param-
eter ®. This result is very intuitive. The larger the output each ¯rm yields, the greater is the
social bene¯t of R&D; further a larger ® yields the larger output.
Proposition 4(ii) states that when ® is negative (the market is collusive), the equilibrium
R&D is excessive, while a positive ® yields insu±cient R&D. We explain the intuition. When
® is negative, the output level is low. Thus, the social gain of R&D is small, while ¯rms make
relatively large investments in R&D (see Proposition 1). This yields excessive investment. The
social optimal level of R&D is increasing in ® and its equilibrium level is decreasing in ® for
® · 1=3; IE ¡ I¤ is decreasing in ®; it happens to be zero when ® = 0: An increase in ® from
zero yields the insu±cient investment (IE < I¤). See Figure 1.
[Figure 1 AROUND HERE]
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7 Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a relative performance approach in the context of R&D competition; we
investigate the two-stage R&D game in oligopoly markets where ¯rms' payo®s depend on both
absolute and relative pro¯ts. Firm i's payo® is ¼i ¡ ®¼j ; where ¼i is its own pro¯t, ¼j is the
rival's pro¯t, and ® 2 (¡1; 1): We ¯nd the U-shaped relationship between ® and the levels of
R&D investments when the ¯rms choose the levels of R&D investments independently. This
result indicates that innovation is quite active in both altruistic and spiteful preferences, while
it is less active in the intermediate situations. We also show that the second-best R&D level is
increasing in ®; and it is more likely to exceed the equilibrium R&D level when ® is large.
The relative performance approach smoothly connects industrial organizations and prefer-
ences of ¯rms. Our approach contains Bertrand and Cournot competition as special cases, and
a larger ® indicates tougher competition in product markets. Therefore, this approach connects
the standard Cournot situation with the standard Bertrand situation in a peculiar way. More-
over, it has the potential to reveal important properties between toughness of competition and
market performance that have thus far been overlooked. To investigate a general property of the
relationship between market competition and performance remains an issue for future research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Di®erentiating G(®) with respect to ®, we have
dG(®)
d®
=
(a¡ c)(3®¡ 1)
(3¡ ®)3 : (12)
(12) is negative for ® < 1=3 and positive for ® > 1=3. This implies that given c1 = c2 = c, the
marginal bene¯t of R&D is decreasing (increasing) in ® for ® < (>) 1=3. This yields Proposition
1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Di®erentiating H(®) with respect to ®, we have
dH(®)
d®
= ¡2(a¡ d)(1¡ ®)
(3¡ ®)3 : (13)
(13) is negative for ¡1 < ® < 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We prove this proposition along the same lines as Proposition 1.
Di®erentiating J(¯; n) with respect to ¯, we have
@J(¯; n)
@¯
=
(a¡ c)(n¡ 1)2(1 + ¯ ¡ n+ ¯n)
[2 + (1¡ ¯)(n¡ 1)]3 : (14)
Note that (a¡c) and 2+(1¡¯)(n¡1) is always positive. Hence, (14) is negative for 1+¯¡n+¯n <
0 and positive for 1 + ¯ ¡ n+ ¯n > 0. A simple calculation leads us to
@J(¯; n)
@¯
< 0 for ¯ <
n¡ 1
n+ 1
and
@J(¯; n)
@¯
> 0 for ¯ >
n¡ 1
n+ 1
:
This implies that given cj = c for all j, the marginal bene¯t of R&D is decreasing (increasing)
in ¯ for ¯ < (>) (n¡ 1)=(n+ 1). This yields Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4: (i) Di®erentiating K(®) with respect to ¯, we have
dK(®)
d®
=
2(1¡ ®)(a¡ c)
(3¡ ®)3 :
This implies that dK=d® > 0 for all ® 2 (¡1; 1). Thus, we have Proposition 4(i).
(ii) Note that I¤ > (<)IE if and only if K(®) > (<)G(®). The simple calculation leads us to
K(®)¡G(®) = (a¡ c)(1¡ ®)®
(3¡ ®)2 :
This implies Proposition 4(ii). Q.E.D.
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